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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Title 77, Chapter 35, Section 26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988) 
and Utah Code Annotated Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section (2)(d) (Supp. 
1988), whereby a defendant in a circuit court criminal action may 
take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and 
conviction for any crime. In this case, the Honorable Paul G. 
Grant, Judge, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
rendered final judgment and conviction against Richard Menke for 
Retail Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial judge abuse his descretion in denying the 
Appellant's Motion to Suppress evidence used at trial to convict him? 
(a) Was there reasonable suspicion for the peace 
officers to stop, detain and question the Appellant? 
(b) Did the peace officers have sufficient probable 
cause to justify the seizure of the property held by the Appeallant? 
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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 602(1) 
(1953 as amended) provides in peitinent part: 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when 
he knowingly: (1) takes possession of, conceals, 
carries away, transfers or causes to be carried away or 
transferred, any merchandise displayed, "held, stored or 
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment 
with no intention of returning such merchandise or with 
the intention of depriving the merchant permanently of 
the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise 
without paying the retail value of such merchandise. 
Utah Code Annotated Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 606 (1953 
as amended) provides as follows: 
A violation of this chapter shall be punished in accordance 
with section 76-6-412(1) 
Utah Code Annotated Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 412(1)(c) 
(1953 as amended) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this 
chapter shall be punishable as follows: 
(c) As a Class A Misdemeanor if the value of the property 
stolen was more than $100.00 but does not exceed $250.00. 
Utah Code Annotated Title 77, Chapter 7, Section 15 (1953 as 
amended) provides as follows: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he 
has committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for Retail 
Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 602(1) (1953 as amended). 
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence taken from 
him at the time of his arrest based on a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (T.3, 106). The trial 
court denied the motion. On October 31, 1988, Appellant entered a 
conditional plea of guilty, specifically preserving his right to 
appeal the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress. On October 
31, 1988, the Honorable Paul G. Grant, Judge, Third Circuit Court, 
Salt Lake Department, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
sentenced Mr. Menke to serve nine (9) months in the Salt Lake County 
Jail and to pay a fine of $2,000.00. Execution of the sentence was 
stayed pending Menke•s appeal of the trial court's ruling on the 
Motion to Suppress. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 26, 1988, Sergeant Giles and Officer Dalling, both 
Salt Lake City Police Officers, were patrolling in the Crossroads Mall 
area of Salt Lake City. They observed the Appellant in the vicinity 
of the Crossroads Mall remove something that looked like a videotape 
from under his shirt, and place the item in a paper sack which he was 
carrying. The officers approached the Appellant, and asked him 
general questions concerning the item he had observed him place in the 
bag. Initially, the Appellant said nothing. When asked specifically 
if the item was a videotape, Appellant responded affirmatively. The 
sack was open, and Officer Dalling was able to observe that the item 
was not a videotape, as was claimed by Appellant. At that point 
Officer Dalling removed the item from the bag. It proved to be an 
electric razor. Appellant then indicated that he had purchased the 
item, but that he had no receipt. Thereupon, Sergeant Giles 
ascertained that the razor had been taken from the Weinstock's store 
in Crossroads Mall, and that it had not been paid for. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARUGMENT 
The trail judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the 
Appellant's Motion to Suppress the evidence at trial used to convict 
hirn. Reasonable suspicion existed for the peace officer to stop, 
detain and question the Appellant. The peace officers had sufficient 
probable cause to justify the seizure of the property held by the 
Appellant. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE USED AT TRIAL TO CONVICT HIM 
A. Reasonable suspicion existed for the peace officers to 
stop, detain and question the Appellant. 
Sergeant Giles observed the Appellant* taking something out 
from under his shirt within 100 feet from the entrance of a large 
retail shopping mall. This action taken by the Appellant gave Sgt. 
Giles articulable suspicion that the crime of retail theft had been 
committed by the Appellant, and justified an investigatory stop of the 
Appellant. 
Every U.S. citizen, of course, is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported 
by Oath of affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
There are, of course, several levels of police/citizen 
encounters. These were outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
following language: 
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(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at anytime 
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer 
has "articulable suspicion" that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 
"detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop;" 
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer 
has probable cause to believe an offense has been 
committed or is being committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting United 
States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
The Utah Legislature has passed the f.ollowing legislation 
defining the "reasonable suspicion" needed for a citizen/police 
encounter as described in (2) above: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand a 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
Title 77, Chapter 7, Section 15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, (1982) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, under this statute: 
...a brief investigatory stop of an individual by 
police officers is permissible when the officers "have 
a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that 
the individual is involved in criminal activity." 
State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (quoting State v. 
Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985)); State v. Christensen, 676 
P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984). 
This Court has followed the Utah Supreme Court, holding that: 
x 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the 
detaining officer must have a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting criminal activity by the 
particular person detained. 
State v. Serv, 758 P2d 935, 941 (Utah App. 1988), quoting UMt_ed 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418. See State v. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987). 
In the case of State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 
1987), this Court gave further guidance in determining when 
reasonable suspicion exists for an officer to stop a citizen: 
We acknowledge that a trained law enforcement 
officer may be able to perceive and articulate meaning 
in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the 
untrained observer. \United State v. Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. 544, 564, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1882 (1980) (Plural ity 
opinion).] The officer is entitled to assess the facts 
in light of his experience. I_d at 565, 100 S.Ct. at 
1883. 
In the case at bar, the officer noticed the Appellant 
pulling something from under his shirt within 100 feet of the 
entrance to a large retail shopping mall. Even if this were wholly 
innocent conduct, Sgt. Giles had the right to assess what he 
perceived the Appellant do in light of his more than 6 years' 
experience in burglary and theft investigations, which led him to 
believe that the Appellant was retrieving stolen property from 
inside his shirt. However, storing merchandise within one's shirt, 
especially in light of where he was in proximity to the shopping 
mall and the fact that he was holding two bags at the time, does not 
constitute wholly innocent conduct. The reasonable lay observer 
would come to the same conclusion as Sgt. Giles. Hence, we do not 
have the situation that was present in State .v. Swanigan, 699 P. 2d 
718 (Utah 1985), wherein a police officer made an investigatory stop 
on the basis of a "hunch"; rather, Sgt, Giles and Officer Dalling 
had articulable, objective reasons that a crime had been committed 
by the Appellant. 
This action did not amount to a formal "seizure", as is 
contended by the Appellant. (See Brief of Appellant, pp. 6-10). 
The United States Supreme Court has looked to several factual 
circumstances in determining whether a police/citizen encounter 
rises to the level of an actual "seizure." In the Mendenhall case, 
Justice Powell wrote for the Court: 
On the facts of this case, no "seizure" of the 
respondent occurred. The events took place in the 
public concourse. The agents wore no uniforms and 
displayed no weapons. They did not summon the 
respondent to their presence, but instead approached 
her and identified themselves as federal agents. They 
requested, but did not demand to see the respondent's 
identification and ticket. Such conduct, with more, 
did not amount to an intrusion upon any 
constitutionally protected interest. The respondent 
was not seized simply by reason of the fact that the 
agents approached her, asked her if she would show then 
her ticket and identification, and posed her a few 
questions. Nor was it enough to establish a seizure 
that the person asking the questions was a law 
enforcement official. [Citations omitted] In short, 
nothing in the record suggests that the respondent had 
any objective reason to belive that she was not free to 
end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on 
her way, and for that reason we conclude that the 
agent'b initial approach to her was not a seizure. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555. 
In the facts at issue, the stop of the Appellant occurred on 
the sidewalk of 100 South State Street, in Salt Lake City, a busy 
street and certainly a public concourse. Just like the facts in 
Mendenhall, the officers talking to the Appellant also were plain 
clothes policemen, who also identified themselves with a badge and 
requested identification from the Appellant. The mere fact that the 
Appellant did not answer any of the questions that the officers 
asked him do not indicate an objective reason for the Appellant to 
believe that he was not free to go. 
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B. The peace officers had sufficient probable cause to 
justify the seizure of the property held by the Appellant. 
After the stop of the Appellant, the officers asked him if 
what was in the bag was a video tape. The Appellant answered 
affirmatively. (R. at p. 9). From the way that the Appellant was 
holding the bag, Officer Dalling could see into the bag, and could see 
that the item being queried about was not, in fact a video tape. (R. 
at p. 30). This obvious lie by the Appellant, in addition to the 
actions taken by Appellant to raise a reasonable suspicion (see A 
above), gave the police officers probable cause to believe that a 
crime had been committed, and allowed them to seize the contents of 
the Appellant's bag, and place the Appellant under arrest. 
Appellant makes much of the fact that the officers knew the 
Appellant was lying by looking into the bag that Appellant was 
holding. The United States Supreme Court has held that: 
...the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the 
owner of every container that conceals its contents 
from plain view 
United States v. Ross, 456, U.S. 798, 822-823 (1982) (emphasis 
added); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981). 
The important fact to note is that the Fourth Amendment will 
protect those items that an aggrieved person has shown a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The testimony of the officers is that 
Appellant was holding the bags in such a way that anyone, the 
officers included, could see into the bags. Assuming that the 
viewing was lawful, then there was probable cause for seizure of what 
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was seen, given that it was obvious to Officer Dalling that what was 
in the bag was not what he said was in the bag. (R. p. 30). That 
seizure, then, need not be made with a warrant. See United States 
v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110 (2nd Cir. 1980), where a notebook was 
protruding from a plastic bag on the front seat of the defendant's 
car when defendant was arrested for drug dealing. The Second 
Circuit held that "opening such a book to ascertain its contents and 
possible evidentiary value was not improper." 635 F.2d at 113. 
In the facts of the case at bar, the officers could see into 
the bag easily from where they had a right to be. Even though there 
had been no theft reports received by the officers, it does not 
affect the fact that they could find probable cause that a crime had 
been committed. Indeed, Ernest LaFave has written: 
[In] the more typical case however... the officer 
is not assessing the observed events in terms of their 
relationship to a particular prior offense of which he 
is aware. Rather, the policeman is considering whether 
his first-hand knowledge itself shows that the property 
he now sees probably was acquired illegally on some 
prior occasion. Prubabie cause can exist in such 
circumstances, for it is not essential to a finding of 
probable cause that the officer be able to relate the 
person or property to some particular prior crime. 
La Fave, Search and Seizure, Vol. II, 3.6(a). 
The false response to the reasonable question of a peace 
officer may well constitute probable cause. This is a position that 
is held in numerous jurisdictions. State v. Valenzuela, 589 P.2d 
1306 (Ariz. 1979) (stating that "a false answer in response to 
questions by the police based on the police officer's personal 
knowledge may constitute probable cause"); People v. Williams, 398 
-xiv-
N.E.2d 1099 (111. 1979) (defendant gave identification known to be 
false after lawful stop for investigation); State v. Busby, 656 
S.W.2d 820 (Mo.App. 1983) (defendant seen with murder victim just 
before the murder said he had not seen victim that day) ; State v. 
Reynolds, 619 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1981) (defendant, previously involved 
in child molestation, lied about presence at shopping mall where 
child abducted and sexually attacked); State v. Tipton, 294 N.W.2d 
869 (Neb. 1980) (defendant, on parole for sexual assault, matched 
general description of person who committed four such assaults 
recently; fact defendant lied in interview by s'aying he had already 
been cleared by another police officer supplied added suspicion 
needed for probable cause to arrest); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 284 
S.E.2d 833 (Va. 1981) (defendant maintained that his trunk was empty 
though it was obviously loaded); and State v. Ward, 603 P.2d 857 
(1979) (robbery suspect said he had entered the store with another 
person found therein, which other person controverted). 
Unresponsive answers from police questioning have also been held to 
aid in establishing probable cause. In Arrington v. United States, 
311 A.2d 838 (D.C.App. 1973), a police officer observed an 
individual bending over a desk in the old Senate Office Building. 
When he asked the defendant what he had been doing in the room, the 
defendant responded, "Nothing." The Court held that: 
It is not too much to expect that if a legitimate 
reason existed for the suspicious behavior, one with 
innocent purpose would hasten to offer it. But when 
appellant elected not to do so, and instead gave the 
response that he did, the fact may—and here we hold, 
did—tip the scales in favor of probable cause to 
believe that appellant had been attempting to steal 
whatever he could find of value in or around the desk. 
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ArringLon, 311 A. 2d at 84 0. See also United States v. Harris, 4 04 
F.Supp. 1116 (E.D.Pa. 1975). 
In the facts of the case at bar, there was sufficient 
probable cause to allow the seizure of the razor from the bag of the 
Appellant. First, the police saw the Appellant remove the item from 
underneath his shirt, thus raising articulable suspicion. Next, 
they asked a few routine, standard questions relating to the 
Appellant, which were unanswered by the Appellant. (R. p. 8). When 
Sgt. Giles asked if the bag contained video tapes, the Appellant 
answered affirmatively. (R. p. 9). From his vantage point, Officer 
Dalling could easily look into the bag and note that it did not 
contain a video tape. (R. p. 30). The case law that has developed 
in the area of Search and Seizure show that the officers had ample 
probable cause to seize the contents of the bag, as the actions 
taken by and responses given by the Appellant led them to reasonably 
believe that a crime had been committed, thus not infringing the 
Consitutionally-protected rights of the Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The State has shown that the temporary investigatory detention o 
f the Appellant, and the subsequent search of the Appellant's bags, were 
within the allowable parameters of the Fourth Amendment to the United S 
tates Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, the conviction of the Ap 
pellant should be upheld. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
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foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 
500 East, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 19th day of 
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the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 
300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 19th day of July, 1989. 
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